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The	detrimental	effects	of	current	counter-extremism
measures	on	British	Muslim	families
Drawing	on	research	conducted	with	British	Muslim	men	and	women	living	in	Leeds	or	Bradford,
Madeline-Sophie	Abbas	argues	that	government	counter-terrorism	measures	have	placed	pressure
on	Muslim	parents	to	counter	extremism	within	their	homes,	something	which	can	negatively	impact
relations	within	these	families.		
Marking	the	first	anniversary	of	the	Manchester	Arena	terror	attack	by	22	year-old	Salman	Abedi	that
claimed	the	lives	of	22	people,	the	terror	threat	is	high	on	both	the	policy	agenda	and	public	consciousness.	Young
Muslims	have	come	under	intense	public	scrutiny	due	to	their	perceived	vulnerability	to	radicalisation.	The	2011
Prevent	strategy,	the	preventative	strand	of	the	UK’s	counter-terrorism	strategy	CONTEST,	has	placed	increased
responsibility	on	parents	to	police	their	children,	including	removing	their	passports	if	suspected	of	travelling	to	join
the	Islamic	State	or	Daesh.	The	security	agenda	has	crept	into	Muslim	households	through	government-sponsored
initiatives	involving	Muslim	parents/families	to	counter	extremism	within	their	households	such	as	Families	Against
Stress	and	Trauma	(FAST),	Educate	Against	Hate	(Department	for	Education	and	Home	Office	2018)	and
#MakingAStand	Campaign	(Home	Office	2014)	which	works	with	Muslim	women,	particularly	mothers,	to	counter
terrorist	recruitment.
Muslim	parents	are	enlisted	in	countering	terrorism,	but	are	also	deemed	responsible	for	its	allure.		The	Radical
Awareness	Network	argues	that	families	may	provide	‘risk	factors’	to	reintegrating	returned	foreign	fighters
depending	on	their	ideological	influence	or	relationship	to	the	returnee,	citing	the	family	as	a	potential	‘breeding
ground’	for	radicalisation.	This	situation	has	meant	that	family	law	has	become	embroiled	in	counter-terrorism	to
‘safeguard’	children.	An	infamous	case	has	been	sisters	Sugra,	Zohra,	and	Khadija	Dawood	who	took	their	nine
children	from	Bradford	to	Syria	to	allegedly	join	the	Islamic	State.
Muslim	families	have	witnessed	increased	scrutiny	from	social	workers,	community	workers,	nongovernmental	and
security	and	law	enforcement	agencies,	leading	to	psychological	repercussions	on	children	and	families.	The	role	of
Muslim	families	in	countering	radicalisation	is	thus	a	pressing	policy	concern,	but	currently	there	is	a	failure	to
address	the	detrimental	effects	that	such	measures	may	have	on	Muslim	family	relations	as	well	as	broader	relations
between	Muslim	families,	the	state,	and	the	wider	non-Muslim	community	in	Britain.
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Drawing	on	in-depth	interviews	with	British	Muslim	men	and	women	living	in	Leeds	or	Bradford,	my	findings	show
that	co-option	of	Muslim	parents	to	counter	extremism	within	their	households	produces	what	I	term	‘internal	suspect
bodies’	arising	from	intersecting	fears	of	the	Muslim	groomer	and	Muslim	youth	‘at	risk’	of	radicalisation.	This
category	emerges	where	Muslim	parents	come	to	view	Islamic	markers	such	as	the	hijab,	jilbab,	and	Islamic	beard
through	the	prism	of	extremism.		Muslim	parents	may	monitor	young	Muslims’	religious	identities	and	engagement	in
Islamic	spaces	and	networks.	Parents	encourage	young	Muslims	to	adopt	a	‘moderate	Muslim’	identity	in	line	with
state	prescriptions	which	in	turn,	restricts	how	young	Muslims	can	perform	their	religious	identities.
Parental	responses	are	connected	to	two	key	fears:	firstly,	of	their	children	becoming	radicalised,	or	indeed
radicalising	others,	and	secondly,	to	protect	them	from	being	wrongfully	targeted	by	state	counter-terrorism	officials.
My	study	thus	also	contributes	an	important	political	argument	of	the	need	to	move	beyond	state-centric	accounts	of
the	‘suspect	community’	to	understand	how	counter-terrorism	measures	pervade	Muslim	families	and	communities,
not	just	those	under	official	suspicion.
Overall,	my	research	shows	that	Muslim	families	are	simultaneously	securitised	and	insecuritised	by	counter-
terrorism	measures.	State	intervention	is	legitimised	by	a	racialised	account	of	Muslim	families,	particularly	Pakistani
Muslim	families,	as	both	a	threat	to	national	security	and	British	values,	transmitted	through	policy	and	media
discourses	and	which	burdens	them	with	countering	extremism	within	their	households.	This	narrative	is	reflected	in
then	Prime	Minister,	David	Cameron’s,	infamous	‘failure	of	state	multiculturalism’	speech	in	which	he	argued	that	in
the	UK	‘some	young	men	find	it	hard	to	identity	with	the	traditional	Islam	practiced	at	home	by	their	parents,’	which
together	with	failure	to	identify	with	British	values,	makes	them	vulnerable	to	radicalisation.	More	recently,	the
controversial	Casey	Review	(2016),	commissioned	by	David	Cameron	to	review	integration,	brandishes	Muslim
communities	with	a	litany	of	problems	including	sectarian	division,	a	lack	of	a	formal	hierarchy,	and	‘a	need	for
clearer	interpretation	of	Islam	for	life	in	the	UK,’	that	collectively	present	Muslim	populations	as	a	threat	to	social
cohesion	in	Britain.
A	key	shift	in	the	narrative	of	counter-extremism	policy	is	required	to	mitigate	the	negative	effects	of	framing	Muslim
households	as	suspect	sites.	Pressures	placed	on	Muslim	parents	to	counter	extremism	within	their	homes	places
the	‘problem’	of	performing	Muslim	identities	as	endogenous	to	Muslim	populations	and	encourages	internal	divisions
and	tensions.	This	situation	conceals	the	negative	impact	of	state	policies	and	further	subjects	Muslims	to	the
restrictions	of	state	governance.
Muslim	parents	fear	talking	to	their	children	about	terrorism	in	case	they	are	referred	under	Prevent,	particularly	since
the	introduction	of	the	Prevent	Duty	under	the	2015	Counter-terrorism	and	Security	Act	which	now	places	a	statutory
duty	on	a	number	of	agencies,	including	schools,	to	report	on	individuals	deemed	‘at	risk’	of	radicalisation.	This	has
meant	that	the	scope	for	young	Muslims	to	discuss	their	beliefs	has	closed	down	which	is	counter-productive	for
combatting	extremism.	Importantly,	external	markers	do	not	mean	that	Islamic	principles	are	being	followed	or	that
Muslims	adopting	Islamic	dress	or	the	beard	are	extremist.	Counter-extremism	policy	that	is	sensitive	to	a	range	of
Islamic	identities	is	required	to	mitigate	not	only	fears	of	state	intrusion,	but	intra-family	tensions	that	are	produced	as
a	result,	to	enable	young	Muslims	to	perform	their	religious	identities	without	fear	of	being	suspect.
_____
Note:	the	above	draws	on	the	author’s	published	work	in	the	Journal	of	Ethnic	and	Migration	Studies.
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